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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 A 1996 law requires that the Executive Branch take 
into custody any person who is removable from this country 
because he has committed, among other things, a crime 
involving moral turpitude or a crime involving a controlled 
substance.  See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 303, 110 Stat. 3009-585-86 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c)).  Detention under this authority is mandatory, does 
not provide for the possibility of release on bond, and does 
not require that the Executive Branch at any time justify its 
conduct.  Pursuant to this law, the petitioner in this case, 
Cheikh Diop, was detained for 1,072 days—two years, eleven 
months, and five days.  The District Court concluded that 
such prolonged detention was lawful.  We disagree.  For the 
following reasons, we conclude that the statute authorizes 
only detention for a reasonable period of time.  After that, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution requires that the Government establish that 
continued detention is necessary to further the purposes of the 
detention statute.  
I. 
Although the merits of the immigration case against 
Diop are not before us, we chronicle his journey through our 
complex immigration system in order to illustrate how 
individual actions by various actors in the immigration 
system, each of which takes only a reasonable amount of time 
to accomplish, can nevertheless result in the detention of a 
removable alien for an unreasonable, and ultimately 
unconstitutional, period of time.  
Days 1-198.  The story begins with Diop‟s receipt of a 
Notice to Appear from the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) on March 19, 2008, charging him as a removable 
alien who had entered the United States unlawfully and as an 
alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, a 2005 
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conviction in Pennsylvania state court for the crime of 
recklessly endangering another person. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (a)(6)(A)(i); see also 18 Pa. Con. Stat. 
Ann. § 2705.  That same day, Diop was detained by the 
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).1  
Thirteen days later, on April 1, Diop had his first appearance 
before an immigration judge.  His case was reset so that he 
could seek counsel.  A subsequent hearing on April 29 had 
the same result.  And on May 27, Diop‟s case became even 
more complicated when the Government
2
 charged that he was 
also removable as an alien convicted of a crime relating to a 
controlled substance.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  
That conviction occurred in 1995, for the Pennsylvania crime 
of possessing a controlled substance with the intent to 
manufacture or deliver it.  See 35 Pa. Con. Stat. § 780-113(a).  
The immigration judge once again reset the proceedings so 
that Diop, who had failed to obtain the assistance of a lawyer, 
would have time to file an application for asylum and 
withholding of removal, which he did on August 12. 
Days 199-261.  On October 3, an immigration judge 
heard Diop describe his arrest, detention, and severe beating 
at the hands of Senegalese government officials.  Diop told 
the immigration court that he fears persecution in Senegal 
because the government of that country believes, based on the 
alleged affiliation of members of his family, that he is a 
member of a separatist group called the Movement of 
Democratic Forces of the Casamance.  The immigration judge 
found Diop to be a credible witness and presumed that his 
                                              
1
 Immigration and Customs Enforcement is a bureau within 
the larger Department of Homeland Security.  For 
convenience, we use the term “Government” as a shorthand 
term to describe their collective efforts, and refer specifically 
to DHS or ICE only when necessary. 
 
2
 In the District Court, the Government filed the declaration 
of John Ellington, Deputy Chief Counsel for the Philadelphia 
Office of ICE.  There, Ellington stated that “respondent 
[Diop] was denied bond” at this May 27 hearing.  The 
declaration provides no further explanation of that statement, 
the reasons for the denial of bond, or whether Diop was even 
eligible for bond in the first place.  
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testimony was completely accurate, but nevertheless denied 
his application for withholding of removal because his 1995 
conviction was “probably” for a “particularly serious crime,” 
which would make him ineligible for that kind of relief, and 
because, even if he was persecuted in the past, changed 
country conditions mean that there is no presumption that he 
would be persecuted in the future.  8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); Denis v. Attorney Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 213 
(3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that withholding of removal is 
unavailable to an alien who has committed a “particularly 
serious crime”).  
Days 262-390.  Diop, still representing himself while 
detained, filed a notice of appeal.  On December 5, 2008, he 
filed a hand-written appellate brief with the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  In a March 17, 2009 order, 
the BIA concluded that the immigration judge should actually 
determine whether his 1995 conviction was a “particularly 
serious crime,” instead of leaving it open as a mere 
probability, disagreed with the judge‟s determination that 
conditions changed in Senegal, and remanded Diop‟s case to 
the immigration judge for further proceedings. 
Days 391-589.  More master calendar hearings 
followed:  one on April 13, 2009, where the case was reset 
and another on May 4 in which Diop explained that he was 
trying to obtain representation from a law school clinic.  On 
May 17, Diop filed another handwritten brief with the court.  
Thirty-eight days later, on June 24, Diop received a second 
ruling from the immigration judge concerning his application.  
This time, the immigration judge concluded that Diop‟s 
asylum application was untimely, but granted his application 
for withholding of removal.  The immigration judge reasoned 
that Diop‟s crime was not particularly serious because Diop 
testified that his 1995 conviction for drug possession involved 
marijuana.  Furthermore, he ruled that the Government had 
not overcome the presumption that Diop would face the threat 
of future persecution if he was sent to Senegal.  On July 21, 
the Government appealed the immigration judge‟s ruling 
concerning withholding of removal, providing, for the first 
time, evidence that Diop‟s 1995 conviction involved the 
distribution of cocaine, not marijuana.  Diop initially 
appealed the ruling concerning asylum, but withdrew that 
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appeal on August 4.  That same day, Diop filed a pro se 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  He 
argued that it is unconstitutional for the government to detain 
him, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), for a prolonged period of 
time without a hearing to determine whether his detention is 
justified. 
Days 590-754.  Approximately three months later, on 
October 29, 2009 the District Court denied Diop‟s habeas 
petition for two reasons.  First, it concluded that Diop‟s 
petition was premature.  Citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the 
District Court observed that, after an order of removal has 
been entered, the Attorney General has 90 days to remove an 
alien, during which time the alien must be detained.  In 
Diop‟s case, removal proceedings were ongoing, so the 90-
day period had yet to begin and Diop‟s petition was filed too 
soon.
3
  Second, on the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in 
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the District Court 
concluded that it was constitutional to hold Diop while his 
proceedings are pending, with no regard to how long the 
proceedings actually take.  Diop then filed a timely pro se 
appeal to this Court. 
Days 755-776.  The appeal in Diop‟s immigration 
case—the appeal from the June 24, 2010 decision of the 
immigration judge—was resolved by the BIA in an order 
issued on April 12, 2010.  However, as in the previous appeal, 
the BIA once again concluded that the immigration judge‟s 
lack of clarity required a remand.  Specifically, the BIA 
explained that a remand was required because the 
immigration judge‟s application of the standard for 
determining what constitutes a particularly serious crime was 
unclear.  Diop, now with help from the appellate litigation 
clinic at Georgetown University Law Center, filed a motion 
for reconsideration.   
                                              
3
 The Government concedes that this was error.  
Respondents-Appellees‟ Answering Br. 10 n.6.  The 
Government‟s basis for detaining Diop was 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c), not § 1231.  The former governs pre-removal 
detention, while the latter applies to aliens who have been 
deemed removable pursuant to a final order.   
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Days 777-959.  Clarifying himself on remand, the 
immigration judge decided, on May 4, 2010 that Diop‟s drug 
crime was particularly serious and that Diop was ineligible 
for withholding of removal.  On October 26, the BIA 
affirmed the immigration judge‟s decision to deny Diop‟s 
application for withholding of removal and denied the motion 
for reconsideration.  But, once again, it remanded for further 
proceedings, this time so that the immigration judge could 
consider whether Diop might be eligible for deferral of 
removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. 
Days 960-987.  Up to this point, a combination of 
continuances to find a lawyer and prepare Diop‟s pro se 
filings, along with several incomplete decisions from the 
immigration judge, had resulted in a 959 day period of 
incarceration, with still no indication of when or whether 
Diop might be able to stay in the United States.  During that 
time, the Supreme Court decided, in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 
S. Ct. 1473 (2010), that a resident alien‟s constitutional right 
to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings 
requires that he be advised of the collateral immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction.  On November 3, 
2010 the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas applied that 
decision retroactively and vacated Diop‟s 1995 conviction.  A 
few weeks later, on November 24, the state of Pennsylvania 
appealed to the Superior Court. 
Days 988-1,037.  On December 1, Diop appeared for 
yet another master calendar hearing, arguing that the vacatur 
of his conviction meant that he was eligible for withholding 
of removal.  The Government asked for time to consider the 
matter and the case was reset.  At the next master calendar 
hearing on January 18, 2011 the Government argued that 
Diop would only be eligible for withholding of removal if the 
Superior Court affirmed the Court of Common Pleas‟s 
vacatur of his 1995 conviction.  The parties then agreed to 
have a hearing on March 1 regarding  Diop‟s claim of a right 
to relief under the Convention Against Torture.  The next day, 
amici in Diop‟s habeas appeal—the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Pennsylvania (collectively, the “ACLU”)—contacted counsel 
for the Government to seek consent to file a supplemental 
appendix in this Court updating us on the status of Diop‟s 
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immigration proceedings.  The day after that, on January 20, 
2011 the Government reversed its litigating position in the 
immigration courts and filed a motion stating that Diop was 
immediately eligible for withholding of removal, even though 
the vacatur of his 1995 conviction was still on appeal.   
Days 1,038-1,072.  We heard oral argument on this 
appeal on January 24, 2011.  The next week, at a master 
calendar hearing in the immigration court on February 2, the 
Government confirmed to the immigration judge that its 
position was that Diop was immediately eligible for 
withholding of removal.  In a ruling on February 22, the 
immigration judge granted Diop withholding of removal.  
Finally, on February 24, 2011 after 1072 days of detention, 
four rulings by an immigration judge, three rulings by the 
BIA, a state court ruling on his 1995 conviction and a 
subsequent pending appeal to the intermediate state court, a 
ruling by a federal district court judge on his habeas petition, 
and an appeal to this court, Diop was freed.   
The Government waived its right to appeal the 
February 24, 2011 holding.  The next day, it filed a motion in 
this court arguing that Diop‟s federal habeas appeal is moot 
because Diop has been released from custody.  Our first task, 
then, is to determine whether we still have jurisdiction to 
decide the merits of Diop‟s habeas petition.  
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
2241.  Congress has authorized our jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, but the Constitution vests us with jurisdiction 
only to decide “cases or controversies.”  U.S. Const. art. III, § 
2; Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. ---, slip op. at 5 (June 20, 
2011).  This means that Diop must have “standing”—the 
personal stake in a lawsuit that exists when a person has 
suffered an “injury in fact,” caused by “the conduct 
complained of,” that can be “redressed by a favorable 
decision”—at all stages of review and not just at the time he 
filed his habeas petition.  Camreta v. Greene, 564 U.S. ---, 
slip op. at 5 (May 26, 2011); Arizonans for Official English v. 
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997) (“Mootness has been 
described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame:  The 
requisite personal interest that must exist at the 
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commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue 
throughout its existence (mootness).” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).
4
   
Diop‟s prolonged detention was certainly an injury in 
fact, caused by the Government, which could have been 
redressed by a decision from this Court granting his petition 
for writ of habeas corpus.  However, the Government asserts 
that these things are no longer true, so Diop‟s case is moot.  
We disagree.  Diop‟s case falls within the special mootness 
exception for cases that are “capable of repetition” while 
“evading review.”  Turner, 564 U.S. ---, slip op. at 6 (quoting 
S. Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 
U.S. 498 (1911)).  This exception applies when “(1) the 
challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully 
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a 
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] 
be subjected to the same action again.”  Id. (quoting 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)).  
The difficulty with determining whether Diop‟s 
detention is too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation 
is that, although Diop was detained for over three years, the 
claim that his detention was unlawful could not have been 
filed immediately.  Instead, it would have had to “ripen” at 
some unspecified time that is “notoriously hard to pinpoint.”  
Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Services, Inc. v. Int’l Union of 
Operating Eng’rs, Local Union No. 66, 580 F.3d 185, 190 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  Further compounding the difficulty of evaluating 
claims of unlawful pre-removal detention is that the 
underlying removal proceedings justifying detention may 
very well be nearing a resolution by the time a federal court 
of appeals is prepared to consider them.  A court of appeals 
reviewing these types of claims is therefore presented with a 
moving target, knowing only that review must happen 
                                              
4
 Standing must be distinguished from the separate and 
distinct inquiry into whether a petitioner is “in custody,” as 
required under the habeas statutes.  “[W]hat matters for the 
„in custody‟ requirement is whether the petitioner was in 
custody at the time his habeas petition was filed.”  
Kumarasamy v. Attorney General, 453 F.3d 169, 173 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  Diop was in custody when he filed his petition. 
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sometime after an alien has been detained and before he is 
released, but never knowing the precise time period in which 
the case is ripe.     
Given these difficulties, mootness would likely doom 
almost any attempt to challenge the lawfulness of pre-
removal detention.  The law is not so rigid.  In United States 
v. Frumento, this Court recognized that a case is not moot if a 
litigant contesting his detention takes “prompt, diligent, and 
timely” action to perfect his appeal, especially “when 
fundamental personal liberties are at issue and review of an 
order of confinement as a practical matter is not available[.]”  
552 F.2d 534, 541 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc); see also Lee v. 
Stickman, 357 F.3d 338, 343 (3d Cir. 2004).  Diop had been 
detained for one year, four months, and sixteen days before 
he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus complaining that 
detention for this length of time was unreasonable and hence, 
unauthorized.  Once filed, his actions in that proceeding were 
“prompt, diligent and timely,” as was his conduct in the 
subsequent appeal to this court.  Assuming, without deciding, 
that his claim was ripe on the day he filed his petition, Diop‟s 
detention for another year, six months, and twenty days was 
less than the two years the Supreme Court has found to be too 
short to be fully litigated in other contexts, see Turner, 564 
U.S. ---, slip op. at 6 (citing S. Pac. Terminal Co., 219 U.S. at 
514-516 (1911) for the proposition that a two-year period can 
be too short), and is the type of claim that, given the practical 
reality of its highly contingent nature, will always evade 
review. 
Diop‟s claim is also capable of repetition.  The 
Government, which bears the burden of proving that this 
appeal is moot, Princeton Cmty. Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 
582 F.2d 706, 710 n.9 (3d Cir. 1978), argues that there is no 
“reasonable expectation” or “demonstrated probability” that 
Diop will again be the subject of prolonged detention.  See 
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 483 (1982).  In Murphy, the 
named plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting 
the unconstitutionality of a Nebraska constitutional provision 
requiring pretrial detention without bail for those accused of 
sex crimes.  Before the case could be heard on appeal, 
Murphy‟s trial for the underlying sex crimes ended with his 
conviction on three counts.  Nevertheless, he argued that the 
11 
challenge to his pretrial detention was not moot because his 
convictions were still on appeal.  The Supreme Court 
disagreed.  It reasoned that there was no evidence in the 
record that his convictions would be overturned, and hence 
the possibility that they might be was “wholly speculative.”  
Id., 455 U.S. at 483 & n.7. 
Diop is in a different situation because the prospect of 
his once again being detained by the Government is not 
wholly speculative.  His case is closer to the one presented in 
Frumento, where a criminal defendant was held in contempt 
and imprisoned until he either complied with a court order to 
testify in a trial or that trial was finished.  Before his appeal 
could be heard, the trial ended and he was released.  
Nevertheless, we held that his appeal was not moot for two 
reasons.  First, he might once again be subpoenaed to give 
testimony at trial and, upon his refusal, would once again be 
held in contempt and detained; second, holding his appeal to 
be moot would make it impossible to evaluate the significant 
issues of personal liberty at stake.  552 F.2d at 540. 
The Government doggedly pursued Diop‟s detention 
and removal for three years.  Should the vacatur of his 1995 
conviction be overturned on the ground that Padilla is not 
retroactive—a possibility that is far from remote5—Diop 
would once again be ineligible for withholding of removal 
and the Government‟s position in this appeal—that 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c) requires Diop‟s detention without a bond hearing—
would lead it to once again place Diop in confinement.  In 
addition, the Government‟s current litigating position that the 
vacatur is immediately effective is contrary to its position in 
other similar cases, see, e.g., McLeod v. Mukasey, 287 F. 
                                              
5
 We recently held that the Supreme Court‟s decision in 
Padilla v. Kentucky is retroactive.  United States v. Orocio, --
- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 2557232, at *7 (3d Cir. June 29, 2011).  
However, there is no judicial consensus on the issue and 
many lower courts have come to a contrary conclusion.  See  
United States v. Shafeek, 2010 WL 3789747 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 22, 2010); Martin v. United States, 2010 WL 3463949 
(C.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2010); Gacko v. United States, 2010 WL 
2076020 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010).  
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App‟x 562, 563 (9th Cir. 2008), lending further support to the 
conclusion that Diop‟s freedom is based on little more than 
governmental grace, subject to change at its discretion.
 6
  And 
finally, in its briefs here the Government argued that Diop 
could be detained on the basis of his 2005 conviction.  In 
short, it is reasonable for Diop to fear that he might once 
again be the subject of lengthy removal proceedings and pre-
removal detention at any time.  His appeal falls into an 
exception to the mootness rule.  
Even if Diop‟s case did not fall into the exception for 
cases capable of repetition yet evading review, we would still 
conclude that he maintains his standing in this appeal.  In 
Camreta v. Greene, the Supreme Court held that government 
officials retained standing to challenge an appellate court 
ruling that they had violated the Fourth Amendment, even 
though that same court found that the government officials 
had immunity and, therefore, could not be ordered to pay 
money damages.  564 U.S ---, slip op. at 5-7.  The Supreme 
Court reasoned that in situations where an official regularly 
engages in the conduct deemed unconstitutional, the 
judgment results in a continuing injury because the official 
then operates in the shadow of potential liability.  “So long as 
[the judgment] continues in effect, [the official] must either 
change the way he performs his duties or risk a meritorious 
damages action.”  Id. at 7.  “Only by overturning the ruling on 
appeal can the official gain clearance to engage in the conduct 
in the future. . . . [C]onversely, if the person who initially 
brought the suit may again be subject to the challenged 
conduct, she has a stake in preserving the court‟s holding.”  
Id. 
Camreta differs from this case in important respects.  
Here, there are no money damages at issue.  Also, the District 
Court found that the Government‟s conduct did not violate 
the Constitution.  Nevertheless, Camreta provides a helpful 
lesson in standing that is applicable to this case.  Here, even 
without the potential for monetary damages that existed in 
                                              
6
 This court has a longstanding policy of not citing to not-
precedential decisions.  We cite to McLeod not to make any 
substantive legal point, but only to show that the Government 
has assumed a different litigating position in similar cases.  
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Camreta, the Government and its officials retain an interest in 
ensuring that they operate within the bounds of the 
Constitution, see id. at 7 n.4 (explaining that government 
officials have a stake in the outcome of a case “independent 
of any future suit brought by a third party” because a ruling 
that its conduct is not constitutional will change their 
behavior). 
Additionally, in this case, “the person who initially 
brought the suit” (Diop) “may again be subject to the 
challenged conduct” (prolonged pre-removal detention by 
ICE).  Diop‟s newfound freedom is the fragile result of 
several precarious conditions.  First, if the vacatur of his 1995 
conviction is overturned on appeal, Diop would once again be 
subject to mandatory detention by ICE.  Second, the 
Government‟s consistent position throughout this appeal has 
been that Diop‟s detention is required not only because of his 
1995 drug conviction, but also because of his 2005 conviction 
for recklessly endangering another person.  (Respondent-
Appellee‟s Answ. Br. 16 n.8; Respondent-Appellee‟s Resp. to 
Brief for Amici Curiae 27).  That 2005 conviction has not 
been vacated, which means that Diop “may again be subject 
to the challenged conduct” and hence continues to have “a 
stake in preserving the court‟s holding.”  Camreta, 564 U.S. -
--, slip op. at 7.  The Government has, for over three years, 
zealously guarded its power to detain Diop while pursuing its 
removal case against him; as explained above, the record 
provides a strong basis for the conclusion that Diop may 
again be subject to detention. 
The issues raised in Diop‟s appeal are capable of 
repetition and are the kinds of issues that would almost 
always evade review by this court.  Moreover, under 
Camreta, he retains an interest in this appeal despite his 
release. For these reasons, we conclude that there is a case or 
controversy over which we must exercise jurisdiction. 
III. 
We liberally construe Diop‟s pro se petition for writ of 
habeas corpus and his appellate briefs to argue that his 
detention cannot be authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because 
(1) neither his 1995 nor his 2005 convictions provide a basis 
for detaining him under the statute; and (2) even if they do 
14 
provide such a basis, any purported authority to detain him 
for a prolonged period of time without a bond hearing would 
be unconstitutional.  The Government resists each of these 
conclusions.  
A. 
We begin with the argument that neither of Diop‟s 
prior criminal convictions authorizes his detention because, if 
they do not, then his detention is unlawful independent of any 
constitutional concerns.  See Doe v. Pennsylvania Bd. Of 
Probation and Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 102 (3d Cir. 2008) (“As a 
first inquiry, we must avoid deciding a constitutional question 
if the case may be disposed of on some other basis.”). 
Section 236(a) of the IIRIRA, now codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a), provides that “on a warrant issued by the Attorney 
General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a 
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the 
United States.”7  The statute then authorizes the Attorney 
General to release an alien on bond “except as provided in 
subsection (c).”  Subsection (c), in turn, states that “[t]he 
Attorney General shall take into custody,” “when released” 
following his sentence, “any alien who . . . is deportable by 
reason of having committed,” among other crimes, one 
“involving moral turpitude” or one “relating to a controlled 
substance.”  8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (emphasis added) (cross-
referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), for crimes involving 
moral turpitude and § 1227(a)(2)(B) for crimes relating to a 
controlled substance).  
Subsection (a) of this statute expressly provides that 
the Attorney General “may release the alien on bond” 
pending a decision as to whether that alien is to be removed.  
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).  Subsection (c) contains no such 
language.  Instead, it says that aliens detained under that 
subsection may be released only if the Attorney General 
                                              
7
 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred most of the 
Attorney General‟s immigration-related responsibilities to the 
newly formed Department of Homeland Security.  See 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 
Stat. 2135 (2002); Alli v. Decker, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 
2450967, at *1 n.2 (June 21, 2011).  
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decides that they should be part of the federal witness 
protection program.  8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2). 
Diop asserts that his 1995 conviction for possessing a 
controlled substance cannot be the basis of his detention 
under the authority of § 1226(c) because he was not taken 
into custody “when released” for that offense;  and his 2005 
conviction is no reason to detain him without bond because 
that conviction is not one involving moral turpitude.  The 
Government ignores Diop‟s argument regarding his 1995 
conviction and instead relies on the assertion that the 2005 
conviction is one involving moral turpitude.  (Respondents‟-
Appellees‟ Answering Br. 16 n.8). 
The dispute over whether Diop‟s conviction is, as a 
definitive legal matter, one involving moral turpitude, is 
irrelevant.  If the statute required certitude that an alien was 
deportable before that alien could be detained, then no alien 
could ever be detained because the question of removability 
cannot be answered until after proceedings in the immigration 
courts are resolved.  The appropriate question is whether 
applicable regulations, and interpretations of the governing 
statutes by the BIA, allow ICE to detain Diop with some level 
of suspicion, but no definitive legal conclusion, that he is 
covered by § 1226(c).  They do.  According to the regulations 
and the commentary accompanying them, an authorized ICE 
agent may detain an alien if there is “reason to believe that 
this person was convicted of a crime covered by the statute.”  
63 Fed. Reg. 27444; 8 C.F.R. § 236.1; In re Joseph I, 22 I. & 
N. Dec. 660, 668 (B.I.A. 1999).  Immigration judges then 
have the authority to review the ICE agent‟s initial 
determination that a person is subject to detention at a Joseph 
hearing.  See In re Joseph II, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A. 
1999);  see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 n.3 (explaining that 
a Joseph hearing gives an alien the opportunity to avoid 
mandatory detention by establishing that he is not an alien, 
was not convicted of a crime requiring mandatory detention, 
or is otherwise not subject to mandatory detention).  Because 
neither party attacks the constitutionality of these regulations, 
or the BIA‟s interpretation of the applicable statutes, we will 
assume, without deciding, that they are valid and that they 
authorize Diop‟s pre-removal detention because “there is 
reason to believe”—even if we do not know for sure—that 
16 
the 2005 conviction was for a crime involving moral 
turpitude.
8
  
B. 
 The Government asserts that § 1226(c) says that aliens 
can be detained for as long as removal proceedings are 
“pending,” even if they are “pending” for prolonged periods 
of time.  (Respondents‟-Appellees‟ Answ. Br. at 17).  Diop 
counters that his detention is unlawful because § 1226(c) does 
not authorize prolonged detention without a bond hearing.  In 
support, amicus ACLU notes that courts interpret statutes 
with the presumption that Congress does not intend to pass 
unconstitutional laws.  For this reason, “it is a cardinal 
principle of statutory interpretation . . . that when an Act of 
Congress raises a serious doubt as to its constitutionality, . . . 
[courts] will first ascertain whether a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be 
avoided.”  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001).  
Applying this principle to § 1226(c), we conclude that the 
statute implicitly authorizes detention for a reasonable 
amount of time, after which the authorities must make an 
individualized inquiry into whether detention is still necessary 
to fulfill the statute‟s purposes of ensuring that an alien 
attends removal proceedings and that his release will not pose 
a danger to the community.  
1. 
 Our Constitution forbids the Government from 
depriving “any person” of “life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  This Due 
                                              
8
 Because the Government relies solely on the 2005 
conviction for its authority to detain Diop, we do not reach 
the issue of whether he can be detained because of his 1995 
conviction.  In addition, because the parties do not question 
the constitutional adequacy of a Joseph hearing, we decline to 
address it here.  We note, however, that the issue is an open 
one, see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.2 (2003), and 
that at least one circuit judge has expressed grave doubts as to 
whether Joseph is consistent with due process of law, see 
Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Tashima, J., concurring).  
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Process Clause refers to “any person,” which means that 
aliens, no less than native-born citizens, are entitled to its 
protection.  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 693.  Thus, § 
1226(c) raises a serious risk of running afoul of this command 
unless it is premised on a “sufficiently strong special 
justification.”  Id. at 690. 
 The Supreme Court has concluded that it is, at least on 
its face.  Reading through the legislative history in Demore v. 
Kim, the Supreme Court noted that Congress was concerned 
with the immigration authorities‟ “wholesale failure” to “deal 
with the increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens.”  538 
U.S. at 518.  Section 1226(c) was intended to remedy this 
perceived problem by ensuring that aliens convicted of 
certain crimes would be present at their removal proceedings 
and not on the loose in their communities, where they might 
pose a danger.  Demore, 538 U.S. at 519; id. at 531 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).   
The Supreme Court‟s opinion emphasized Congress‟s 
broad power to pass laws relating to immigration.  Id. at 521 
(“In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and 
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens.” (quoting Mathews v. 
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976))).  It reasoned that, although 
Congress‟s powers are limited by the  Due Process Clause, 
aliens‟ due process rights are not necessarily violated when 
they are initially detained without a specific, individualized, 
finding that a particular alien poses a flight risk or a risk of 
danger to the community.  Id. at 523-34 (citing Carlson v. 
Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)). 
Justice Kennedy concurred in the Supreme Court‟s 
opinion, but highlighted an important limitation on the scope 
of its holding.  In his view, Congress‟s broad immigration 
powers allow it to pass a law authorizing an alien‟s initial 
detention, so long as those implementing the statute provide 
individualized procedures through which an alien might 
contest the basis of his detention—a requirement satisfied in 
Demore when the petitioner, Hyung Joon Kim, received a 
Joseph hearing.  Id. at 532.  Critically, Justice Kennedy added 
that even if an alien is given an initial hearing, his detention 
might still violate the Due Process Clause if “the continued 
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detention became unreasonable or unjustified.”  Id.  “Were 
there to be an unreasonable delay by the [Immigration and 
Naturalization Services (“INS”)]9 in pursuing and completing 
deportation proceedings, it would become necessary then to 
inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, 
or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to 
incarcerate for other reasons.”  Id. at 532-33. 
Justice Kennedy‟s opinion provides helpful guidance 
on how to interpret the Demore opinion.  Under the Supreme 
Court‟s holding, Congress did not violate the Constitution 
when it authorized mandatory detention without a bond 
hearing for certain criminal aliens under § 1226(c).  This 
means that the Executive Branch must detain an alien at the 
beginning of removal proceedings, without a bond hearing—
and may do so consistent with the Due Process Clause—so 
long as the alien is given some sort of hearing when initially 
detained at which he may challenge the basis of his detention.  
However, the constitutionality of this practice is a function of 
the length of the detention.  At a certain point, continued 
detention becomes unreasonable and the Executive Branch‟s 
implementation of § 1226(c) becomes unconstitutional unless 
the Government has justified its actions at a hearing inquiring 
into whether continued detention is consistent with the law‟s 
purposes of preventing flight and dangers to the community.
10
  
                                              
9
 The responsibilities of the INS were assumed by three 
different agencies—ICE, Customs and Border Protection, and 
Citizenship and Immigration Services—within DHS when 
Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  See 
Lin-Zheng v. Attorney General, 557 F.3d 147, 152 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (citing Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)). 
 
10
 Although it did not frame the issue this way, we read 
Justice Kennedy‟s decision to uphold the statute on its face, 
while leaving open the possibility that it might be 
unconstitutional as applied.  In other words, Congress did not 
violate the Constitution when it passed the law, but the 
Executive Branch might violate the Constitution in individual 
circumstances depending on how the law is applied.  See 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 
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This will necessarily be a fact-dependent inquiry that will 
vary depending on individual circumstances.  We decline to 
establish a universal point at which detention will always be 
considered unreasonable.
 11
 
The Supreme Court‟s opinion in Carlson v. Landon, 
342 U.S. 524 (1952), does not conflict with the result we 
reach in this case.
12
  According to Demore, Carlson held that 
it was constitutional to detain the aliens in that case—deemed 
deportable because of their participation in Communist 
activities—without an individualized determination of their 
dangerousness or their likelihood of flight.  538 U.S. at 524.  
However, this reading of Carlson—permitting an alien to be 
initially detained without an individualized hearing—is 
consistent with Justice Kennedy‟s view that, at some point 
past this initial period, detention can become unreasonable, 
and hence unconstitutional, unless there is an individualized 
inquiry into whether detention advances the purposes of the 
statute. 
For the same reason, we conclude that the Supreme 
Court‟s holding in Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), does 
not control the outcome of this case.  There, a class of alien 
                                                                                                     
62 Stan. L. Rev. 1209, 1230-35 (2010) (describing “as 
applied” and facial challenges in this manner).  
 
11
 In this regard, we note that our decision today differs from 
our prior decision in Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 
2001), which was overruled by the Supreme Court in 
Demore.  See Demore, 538 U.S. at 516.  Patel‟s holding was 
much broader.  In Patel, this Court held that §1226(c) was 
unconstitutional in all circumstances unless all aliens 
detained pursuant to that statute received an individualized 
bond hearing.  Our much narrower holding today, by contrast, 
is that the statute is only unconstitutional when it is applied to 
detain someone for an unreasonable length of time without 
further individualized inquiry into whether detention is 
necessary to carry out the purposes of the statute.  
 
12
 The parties do not address the substance of this decision in 
their briefs.  However, as binding Supreme Court precedent, 
we are required to address it. 
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juveniles argued that it was unconstitutional for the 
immigration authorities to detain juveniles and release them 
only into the care of a parent, legal guardian or other 
specified adult relative.  The Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the detention.  However, the detention in 
that case was not mandatory.  Moreover, just like Carlson, a 
reading of Flores that purported to uphold detention for an 
unreasonable length of time without further individualized 
inquiry would be contrary to Justice Kennedy‟s concurrence 
in Demore.  
In short, when detention becomes unreasonable, the 
Due Process Clause demands a hearing, at which the 
Government bears the burden of proving that continued 
detention is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the detention 
statute.  
2. 
This leaves us with the question of whether Diop‟s 
prolonged detention in this case was unconstitutionally 
unreasonable and, therefore, a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.  We conclude that it was.  Demore emphasized that 
mandatory detention pursuant to § 1226(c) lasts only for a 
“very limited time” in the vast majority of cases.  538 U.S. at 
529 & n.12.  In fact, Demore relied on statistics showing that 
detention under § 1226(c) “lasts roughly a month and a half in 
the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about 
five months in the minority of cases in which an alien chooses 
to appeal.”  Id. at 530.  This leads us to believe that the result 
may well have been different had the petitioner in Demore 
been detained for significantly longer than the average.  
Indeed, the petitioner in Demore had been detained for only 
slightly longer than the average (6 months) when his habeas 
petition was decided.  Assuming, without deciding, that this 
was a presumably reasonable period of detention, and 
comparing it to Diop‟s 35 months of detention, which was 
nearly six times longer, leads us to conclude that Diop‟s 
detention, without any post-Joseph hearing inquiry into 
whether it was necessary to accomplish the purposes of § 
1226(c), was unreasonable. 
The Government argues that there was no 
“unreasonable delay” in Diop‟s proceedings because he was 
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given continuances to find an attorney, to draft an application 
for asylum and withholding of removal, and because he took 
several appeals.  Diop responds that the delay is attributable 
to the immigration judge‟s continued errors, which 
necessitated the appeals and remands.  We agree with the 
Government that the reasonableness determination must take 
into account a given individual detainee‟s need for more or 
less time, as well as the exigencies of a particular case.  But 
we also conclude that reasonableness must take into account 
errors in the proceedings that cause unnecessary delay.  No 
system of justice can be error-free, and those errors require 
time to fix.  Nevertheless, in this case the immigration judge‟s 
numerous errors, combined with the Government‟s failure to 
secure, at the earliest possible time, evidence that bore 
directly on the issue of whether Diop was properly detained, 
resulted in an unreasonable delay.   
We cannot simply rely on the Government‟s 
determination of what is reasonable.  Although judicial 
deference to the Executive Branch in the immigration context 
is “of special importance” because officials “exercise 
especially sensitive political functions that implicate 
questions of foreign relations,” Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 
1163-64 (2009), courts reviewing petitions for writ of habeas 
corpus must exercise their independent judgment as to what is 
reasonable, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (“Whether a set of 
particular circumstances amounts to detention within, or 
beyond, a period reasonably necessary to secure removal is 
determinative of whether the detention is, or is not, pursuant 
to statutory authority.  The basic federal habeas corpus statute 
grants the federal courts authority to answer that question.”).  
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court adopted a presumption that 
six months of detention pursuant to the post-removal statute 
was reasonable.  It reasoned that Congress had previously 
doubted the constitutionality of detention for longer than this 
period and observed that such a six-month window would 
free the Executive Branch from excessive interference by the 
judiciary.  Amicus ACLU urges us to adopt a similar position 
in this case.  We decline to adopt such a one-size-fits-all 
approach.  Reasonableness, by its very nature, is a fact-
dependent inquiry requiring an assessment of all of the 
circumstances of any given case.  That being said, we note 
that the reasonableness of any given detention pursuant to § 
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1226(c) is a function of whether it is necessary to fulfill the 
purpose of the statute, and, given that Congress and the 
Supreme Court believed those purposes would be fulfilled in 
the vast majority of cases within a month and a half, and five 
months at the maximum, see Demore, 538 U.S. at 530, the 
constitutional case for continued detention without inquiry 
into its necessity becomes more and more suspect as 
detention continues past those thresholds.  In this case, there 
can be no question that Diop‟s detention for nearly three 
years without further inquiry into whether it was necessary to 
ensure his appearance at the removal proceedings or to 
prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable 
and, therefore, a violation of the Due Process Clause. 
3. 
 It was unconstitutional to detain Diop for nearly three 
years under the authority granted by Congress in § 1226(c).  
Nevertheless, “if Congress has made its intent in the statute 
clear, we must give effect to that intent.”  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 
at 696 (internal quotation marks omitted).  We do not believe 
that Congress intended to authorize prolonged, unreasonable, 
detention without a bond hearing.  For one, the parties have 
not provided any legislative history in support of such a 
conclusion.  Furthermore, in Demore, the Supreme Court 
observed that Congress directed the INS to “complete 
removal proceedings against [criminal aliens] as promptly as 
possible.”  538 U.S. at 530 n.13.  This, combined with 
statistics showing that detention is often for only a brief 
period of time, leads us to believe that Congress did not 
intend to authorize prolonged detention pursuant to § 1226(c) 
without, at some point, requiring further inquiry into whether 
detention is necessary to carry out that statute‟s purpose. 
Accordingly we conclude that § 1226(c) contains an implicit 
limitation of reasonableness:  the statute authorizes only 
mandatory detention that is reasonable in length.  After that, § 
1226(c) yields to the constitutional requirement that there be a 
further, individualized, inquiry into whether continued 
detention is necessary to carry out the statute‟s purpose.  Cf. 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682, 699 (reading § 1231 to contain an 
implicit “reasonable time” limitation on the length of post-
removal detention). 
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IV. 
 Diop maintains a reasonable expectation that he may, 
once again, find himself imprisoned while the authorities sort 
through the complicated laws and procedures governing the 
removal of criminal aliens.  Should he be detained once 
again, our holding provides that he may only be detained for a 
reasonable length of time.  Should the length of his detention 
become unreasonable, the Government must justify its 
continued authority to detain him at a hearing at which it 
bears the burden of proof.  For all of the foregoing reasons, 
we will vacate the District Court‟s decision and order 
dismissing Diop‟s petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
 
